Game Theory

Imagine the following:

What we have here is a stand off. Participant A and Participant B facing one another some scant distance apart, and both have the privilege of adequate cover. Both parties are armed.

What makes this interesting is that both A and B have the same goal. Not as in categorically similar but mutually exclusive, such as vying for a victory only one could claim. That would be simple competition. No, I mean identical. Each wishes to shoot and be shot in turn.

The reason for the stand off is that both participants fear that, should they act, that act might not be reciprocated. A may have misread the situation and, discharging his weapon, be abandoned by B for whom the game is now at an end. B might step out from behind the enclosure too quickly and therefore be found unworthy of escalation in the eyes of A.

So they wait.

Attempts to communicate subtly have been inconclusive. Communicating explicitly is considered action and begins the potentially damaging event cascade described above.

Option #1 – Go

Participant A or Participant B begins the sequence and continues beyond PNR.
Duration: Low
Risk: High

Option #2 – Wait

Eventually it becomes likely that each party is adequately invested in the engagement.
Duration: High
Risk: Low

Option #3 – Quit

The situation is scrapped in favor of a new set of variables.
Duration: Low
Risk: Low

Solve.